Lite tankar om nyintroduktioner

Det kan inte undgått någon att flertalet nyintroduktioner är på ingång. Några av de som kanske fått mest uppmärksamhet i media den senaste tiden är Sanitec och Candyking. Av det jag läst i finanstidningar har de i regel varit positiva till båda introduktionerna. Personligen har jag inte tittat närmare på bolagen på grund av den olustiga kombinationen av att de sätts på börsen av riskkapitalbolag samt med mycket skakiga balansräkningar. Jag har egentligen ingenting att kommentera om just de senaste nyintroduktionerna. Som läsare av böcker på området värdeinvestering har jag tidigt blivit indoktrinerad i att IPO:er (nyintroduktioner) inte är någon attraktiv damm att fiska i. Otroligt många av de klassiska böckerna behandlar kort ämnet och författarna ställer sig i regel tveksamma till den här typen av affärer. Som exempel har jag för mig att Lynch skrivit en del om detta.

Även 4020 och Finansnovis har skrivit inlägg om dessa nyintroduktioner och de har ställt sig tveksamma till introduktionerna. Inläggen har haft ganska intressanta diskussioner i kommentarsfälten och Kalle56 skrev ett mycket tänkvärt citat.

Most IPOs will burn you. People with more information than you have want to sell. Think about that.”

Jag vet inte citatets originalkälla men tycker det säger en hel del. Något jag verkligen tycker man ska betänka innan man investerar i en IPO. Det kan vara så att ett bolag noteras för på grund av familjesuccession, då kanske noteringen sker av andra anledningar än att bara göra en bra affär. Men när ett riskkapitalbolag sätter ett bolag på börsen är det nog mycket sällan de som gör den dåliga affären. Även Aktieingenjören hade en intressant kommentar på Finansnovis inlägg om Candyking där han antar att bolaget under några år kommer tappa värde då det återuppbygger det egna kapitalet. Här håller jag verkligen med honom och det fick mig att tänka på ett av mina favoritinlägg av Geoff Gannon, ”How Today’s Debt Lowers Tomorrow’s Returns”.

Gannon beskriver den ”skuldpendel” som många bolag över tid går igenom. När de har mycket överflödigt kapital sker i regel utdelningar eller återköp för vissa delar av det kapitalet. Detta försvagar balansräkningen samtidigt som det ger aktieägarna avkastning. Den andra punkten på ”skuldpendeln” är när ett bolag har för mycket skulder på balansräkningen och måste lägga mycket av det framtida fria kassaflödet på att betala av skulderna. Detta gör att det finns mindre kapital att ge aktieägarna i form av utdelningar eller återköp. Han kallar stadiet med överflödigt kapital som ”anti-debt” och stadiet med för stora skulder som ”anti-cash”.  

I inlägget skriver Gannon om hur en svag balansräkning inte endast ökar bolagets risk utan också minskar framtida återköp- och utdelningsmöjligheter – vilket i sin tur sänker den framtida avkastningen. Avkastningen till aktieägarna påverkas av multipelförändring, vinsttillväxt och hur mycket som betalas ut under ägandeperioden. Ett hårt skuldsatt bolag påverkar de tre punkterna negativt.

Om balansräkningen måste stärkas kommer stor del av det fria kassaflödet de nästkommande åren gå till att betala tillbaka skulder. Detta leder till att det finns mindre kapital att dela ut till aktieägarna eller att använda till återköp. När utdelningen minskar eller uteblir kommer aktien i regel rent multipelmässigt värderas ned. Detta blir en negativ spiral och kommer i regel sänka den framtida avkastningen för aktieägarna.

Allt detta gäller tyvärr väldigt ofta dessa IPO:er. Det har säkerligen hänt någon gång i världshistorien, men det torde vara mycket ovanligt att bolag som har de motsatta egenskaperna noteras. Gannon skriver dock att skulder kan vara bra, men att det är förändringen av skuldnivån man som aktieägare vill åt. Att man inte har några fördelar i att köpa ett redan hårt skuldsatt bolag utan man vill ha ett bolag som i framtiden kan öka skuldsättningen. Att den viktigaste frågan för framtida avkastning är inte huruvida skuldsättningen ska vara hög eller låg, utan hur den var när vi investerade i bolaget.

Detta är tankegångar riskkapitalbolagen använder sig av. Av det jag läst köper de i regel mycket välkapitaliserade bolag. Bolag som har en mycket stark balansräkning med överflödigt kapital som ej används i verksamheten. Riskkapitalbolagen skapar sedan sin avkastning när de tar bolaget från att vara ”anti-debt” till ”anti-cash”. Under den här processen frigörs mycket kapital som de kan använda på annat vis och verksamheten drivs sedan på ett mer ”optimalt” sätt än innan.

Ett exempel på detta stötte jag på i min analys av Weight Watchers International. Där storägarna Artal (riskkapitalbolag) köpte upp bolaget genom en LBO i slutet av 90-talet och sedan dess har ökat bolagets skuldsättning kraftigt. Skulderna har sedan använts till aggressiva återköp under en längre tid. Bolaget befinner sig just nu i fasen ”anti-cash” och vi aktieägare kommer förmodligen få betala det senaste decenniets tillställning genom att en lägre andel av det framtida fria kassaflödet kommer att användas till återköp och utdelningar.

Nu säger jag inte att detta är det enda riskkapitalbolag gör för att skapa sin avkastning. De drivs förmodligen i regel av både mycket skickliga investerare och företagare som säkert kraftigt kan förbättra tveksamt skötta bolag. Även detta är något som gör mig tveksam till flera IPO:er. Om den som säljer är mycket kompetent och erfaren, ska jag verkligen göra affärer med honom när jag är på motsatt sida bordet? I mina tankar är det som tidigare nämnts kraftigt inpräntat att nyintroduktioner ska man hålla sig undan från. Jag tittar nästan inte på dem och om jag någon gång i framtiden kommer att bli intresserad av att köpa aktier i en IPO kommer jag förmodligen kontrollera min analys både en och två gånger och även efter det vara lite paranoid över att jag missat något.

Men det är säkert lite irrationellt att knappt titta på vad det är för bolag som introduceras. Emellanåt introduceras säkerligen fina bolag av andra anledningar än att en storägare ska göra exit. Men när jag läser att storägaren som noterar bolaget är ett riskkapitalbolag i kombination med att balansräkningen är lövtunn svalnar mitt intresse snabbt. För att jag ska få upp intresset vill jag nog se att balansräkningen är relativt stark samtidigt som noteringen inte endast sker med anledningen av att ägaren vill göra exit.

Om jag inte missminner mig noterades H&M på grund av skattefördelar vid framtida succession inom familjen Persson. Någon sådan anledning ser jag som mycket god för att ta en närmare titt på en nyintroduktion. Med det sagt, hade jag varit där när det begav sig hade jag säkerligen inte köpt H&M av anledning till att det var ett högkvalitativt bolag som förmodligen noterades till en hög multipel.

På grund av den senaste tidens nyintroduktioner började jag tänka på en bok jag läste i somras som behandlade ämnet. Boken ” Contrarian Investment Strategies” av David Dreman har ett mycket intressant kapitel om IPO:er. Kapitlet heter ”How Not to Get Rich”. Dreman beskrev en studie av J. Ritter och T. Loughran om IPO:er mellan 1970-1990 där 4 753 IPO:er undersöktes. Den genomsnittliga avkastningen för dessa aktier under de närmaste fem åren var 3 %, jämfört med S&P 500 som hade 11,3 %.

Detta låter givetvis bedrövligt. Men än värre var att medianavkastningen i undersökningen var -39 %(!). De aktierna som steg som kraftigast var ofta de som hade en begränsad skara tecknare, så när handeln sedan startades för alla sköt kurserna i höjden. Så för en privatperson som hade investerat i alla möjliga IPO:er hade avkastningen förmodligen varit betydligt sämre än de 3 % som alla aktier gav. Dreman beskrev även några mindre studier med liknande resultat.

Allt som allt tycker jag det är mycket som gör att IPO:er rent generellt är ointressanta. Ett rejält informationsunderläge mot säljarna i kombination med svag historisk utveckling gör att det i mina ögon sällan bör vara värt att lägga alltför mycket fokus på att hitta attraktiva nyintroduktioner. Som små privata investerare har vi en otroligt bred flora av investeringsmöjligheter att välja bland och detta tycker jag att man ska utnyttja. Detta genom att välja att fiska i de dammar där vi har störst sannolikhet att göra bra affärer. IPO-dammen har historiskt sett inte varit en sådan och man kan fråga sig om den någonsin kommer att vara det.

Avslutningsvis för dock nyintroduktioner med sig något som i mina ögon är mycket positivt – prospekt. Vid varje analys jag genomför letar jag efter prospekt, antingen från bolaget i fråga eller från konkurrenter inom samma bransch. Anledningen är att prospekten ofta är betydligt mer innehållsrika än årsredovisningarna. Det finns ofta mycket bra information om bolagets marknad som annars kan vara mycket svår att komma över. Om jag hade analyserat Svedbergs idag hade jag garanterat gjort en ordentlig genomläsning av Sanitecs prospekt.  

Jag avslutar inlägget med ett tänkvärt citat av Warren Buffett.

”It’s almost a mathematical impossibility to imagine that, out of the thousands of things for sale on a given day, the most attractively priced is the one being sold by a knowledgeable seller (company insiders) to a less-knowledgeable buyer (investors).”

Orelaterat länktips:

Ny intervju med Peter Lynch: Peter Lynch Journeys From Funds to Philanthropy

Hur ser du på nyintroduktioner?

17 thoughts on “Lite tankar om nyintroduktioner

  • 🙂 Sorry, but …

    1. Saying ”I’ll be greedy when others are fearful” is much easier than actually doing it.

    2. The gulf between a great company and a great investment can be extraordinary.

    3. Markets go through at least one big pullback every year, and one massive one every decade. Get used to it. It’s just what they do.

    4. There is virtually no accountability in the financial pundit arena. People who have been wrong about everything for years still draw crowds.

    5. As Erik Falkenstein says: ”In expert tennis, 80% of the points are won, while in amateur tennis, 80% are lost. The same is true for wrestling, chess, and investing: Beginners should focus on avoiding mistakes, experts on making great moves.”

    6. There are tens of thousands of professional money managers. Statistically, a handful of them have been successful by pure chance. Which ones? I don’t know, but I bet a few are famous.

    7. On that note, some investors who we call ”legendary” have barely, if at all, beaten an index fund over their careers. On Wall Street, big wealth isn’t indicative of big returns.

    8. During recessions, elections, and Federal Reserve policy meetings, people become unshakably certain about things they know nothing about.

    9. The more comfortable an investment feels, the more likely you are to be slaughtered.

    10. Time-saving tip: Instead of trading penny stocks, just light your money on fire. Same for leveraged ETFs.

    11. Not a single person in the world knows what the market will do in the short run. End of story.

    12. The analyst who talks about his mistakes is the guy you want to listen to. Avoid the guy who doesn’t — his are much bigger.

    13. You don’t understand a big bank’s balance sheet. The people running the place and their accountants don’t, either.

    14. There will be seven to 10 recessions over the next 50 years. Don’t act surprised when they come.

    15. Thirty years ago, there was one hour of market TV per day. Today there’s upwards of 18 hours. What changed isn’t the volume of news, but the volume of drivel.

    16. Warren Buffett’s best returns were achieved when markets were much less competitive. It’s doubtful anyone will ever match his 50-year record.

    17. Most of what is taught about investing in school is theoretical nonsense. There are very few rich professors.

    18. The more someone is on TV, the less likely his or her predictions are to come true. (U.C. Berkeley psychologist Phil Tetlock has data on this).

    19. Related: Trust no one who is on CNBC more than twice a week.

    20. The market doesn’t care how much you paid for a stock. Or your house. Or what you think is a ”fair” price.

    21. The majority of market news is not only useless, but also harmful to your financial health.

    22. Professional investors have better information and faster computers than you do. You will never beat them short-term trading. Don’t even try.

    23. How much experience a money manager has doesn’t tell you much. You can underperform the market for an entire career. And many have.

    24. The decline of trading costs is one of the worst things to happen to investors, as it made frequent trading possible. High transaction costs used to cause people to think hard before they acted.

    25. Professional investing is one of the hardest careers to succeed at, but it has low barriers to entry and requires no credentials. That creates legions of ”experts” who have no idea what they are doing. People forget this because it doesn’t apply to many other fields.

    26. Most IPOs will burn you. People with more information than you have want to sell. Think about that.

    27. When someone mentions charts, moving averages, head-and-shoulders patterns, or resistance levels, walk away.

    28. The phrase ”double-dip recession” was mentioned 10.8 million times in 2010 and 2011, according to Google. It never came. There were virtually no mentions of ”financial collapse” in 2006 and 2007. It did come.

    29. The real interest rate on 20-year Treasuries is negative, and investors are plowing money into them. Fear can be a much stronger force than arithmetic.

    30. The book Where Are the Customers’ Yachts? was written in 1940, and most still haven’t figured out that financial advisors don’t have their best interest at heart.

    31. The low-cost index fund is one of the most useful financial inventions in history. Boring but beautiful.

    32. The best investors in the world have more of an edge in psychology than in finance.

    33. What markets do day to day is overwhelmingly driven by random chance. Ascribing explanations to short-term moves is like trying to explain lottery numbers.

    34. For most, finding ways to save more money is more important than finding great investments.

    35. If you have credit card debt and are thinking about investing in anything, stop. You will never beat 30% annual interest.

    36. A large portion of share buybacks are just offsetting shares issued to management as compensation. Managers still tout the buybacks as ”returning money to shareholders.”

    37. The odds that at least one well-known company is insolvent and hiding behind fraudulent accounting are high.

    38. Twenty years from now the S&P 500 (INDEX: ^GSPC ) will look nothing like it does today. Companies die and new ones emerge.

    39. Twelve years ago General Motors (NYSE: GM ) was on top of the world and Apple (Nasdaq: AAPL ) was laughed at. A similar shift will occur over the next decade, but no one knows to what companies.

    40. Most would be better off if they stopped obsessing about Congress, the Federal Reserve, and the president and focused on their own financial mismanagement.

    41. For many, a house is a large liability masquerading as a safe asset.

    42. The president has much less influence over the economy than people think.

    43. However much money you think you’ll need for retirement, double it. Now you’re closer to reality.

    44. The next recession is never like the last one.

    45. Remember what Buffett says about progress: ”First come the innovators, then come the imitators, then come the idiots.”

    46. And what Mark Twain says about truth: ”A lie can travel halfway around the world while truth is putting on its shoes.”

    47. And what Marty Whitman says about information: ”Rarely do more than three or four variables really count. Everything else is noise.”

    48. The bigger a merger is, the higher the odds it will be a flop. CEOs love empire-building by overpaying for companies.

    49. Investments that offer little upside and big downside outnumber those with the opposite characteristics at least 10-to-1.

    50. The most boring companies — toothpaste, food, bolts — can make some of the best long-term investments. The most innovative, some of the worst.
    Kalle56

    Gilla

  • Många tankar om IPOs…..men det finns en ytterligare aspekt.

    De flesta privatinvesterare har begränsad tid, kunskap, erfarenhet och kanske också intresse av att statiskt analysera finansdata för bolag som skall nyintroduceras på börsen.
    Själv bryr jag mig inte ens om att läsa vad finanspressen säger om IPOs, för jag kommer aldrig att köpa några sådana aktier över huvudtaget. Ganska skönt med ett problem mindre.

    ”Contrarian” är en av mina 3 huvudstrategier, och David Dreman är värd att läsa flera gånger.

    Egentligen ett ganska enkelt beslut. Om en säljare med informationsövertag vill sälja på dig aktier i ett bolag som som har rationaliserats för att visa kortsiktiga vinster, blir det ofta ingen långsiktig värdeutveckling. ”Vinst är vad som visas, värde är något annat” för att travestera Warren Buffett.

    Besser

    Gilla

    • Tack för kommentaren Besser. Ja gillade verkligen David Dremans bok. Bara läst den äldsta av de två han skrivit, en av de bättre jag läst måste jag säga. Ska även införskaffa hans nyaste. Ja inte så dumt att relativt snabbt kunna avfärda dem, frigör tid till annat.

      Gilla

  • Ber om ursäkt om jag spammar sönder ditt kommentarsfält men det är ju snart jul, varför inte frossa i Morgan Housel citat. Här kommer den långa listan.:-)

    Here are a few things I’ve picked up along the way …

    1. Saying “I’ll be greedy when others are fearful” is much easier than actually doing it.

    2. Of Warren Buffett’s current $60 billion net worth, $59.3 billion came after his 50th birthday, and $57 billion came after his 60th. Compound interest works its wonders only in very long periods of time.

    3. When most people say they want to be a millionaire, what they really mean is “I want to spend a million dollars,” which is literally the opposite of being a millionaire.

    4. Since 1900 the S&P 500 has returned about 6% per year, but the average difference between any year’s highest close and lowest close is 23%. Remember this the next time someone tries to explain why the market is up or down by a few percentage points. They are basically trying to explain why summer came after spring.

    5. To forecast future market returns, we need to know how valuations will change. But there’s just no way to do that. Valuations reflect people’s feelings about the future. If someone said, “I think most people will be in a 8.7% better mood in the year 2023,” we’d call them delusional. When someone does the same thing by projecting 10-year market returns, we call them analysts.

    6. Investor Nick Murray once said, “Timing the market is a fool’s game, whereas time in the market is your greatest natural advantage.” Remember this the next time you’re compelled to cash out.

    7. When you think you have a great idea, go out of your way to talk with someone who disagrees with it. At worst, you continue to disagree with them. More often, you’ll gain valuable perspective. Fight confirmation bias like the plague.

    8. The business model of the vast majority of financial services relies on exploiting the fears, emotions, and lack of intelligence of customers. The worst part is that the vast majority of customers will never realize this.

    9. Bill Seidman once said, “You never know what the American public is going to do, but you know that they will do it all at once.” Change is as rapid as it is unpredictable.

    10. The phrase “double-dip recession” was mentioned 10.8 million times in 2010 and 2011, according to Google. It never came. There were virtually no mentions of “financial collapse” in 2006 and 2007. It did come. A Similar story can be told virtually every year.

    11. 90% of Warren Buffett’s success can be explained by three factors: Patience, compound interest, and time.

    12. “History doesn’t crawl; it leaps,” writes Nassim Taleb. Events that change the world — presidential assassinations, terrorist attacks, medical breakthroughs, bankruptcies — can happen overnight.

    13. Several studies have shown that people prefer a pundit who is confident to one who is accurate. Not surprisingly, most pundits oblige.

    14. According to economist Burton Malkiel, 57 equity mutual funds underperformed the S&P 500 from 1970 to 2012. The shocking part of that statistic is that 57 funds could stay in business for four decades while posting poor returns. Hope often triumphs over reality.

    15. Our collective memories regarding financial history seem to reach no more than a decade back in time. “Time heals all wounds,” the saying goes. It also erases many important lessons.

    16. Study successful investors, and you’ll notice a common denominator: They are masters of psychology. They can’t control the market, but they have complete control over the gray matter between their ears.

    17. Cognitive psychologists have a theory called “backfiring.” When presented with information that goes against your viewpoints, you not only reject challengers, but double down on your original view. Voters often view the candidate they support more favorably after the candidate is attacked by the other party. In investing, shareholders of companies facing heavy criticism often become die-hard supporters for reasons totally unrelated to the company’s performance.

    18. How long you stay invested for will likely be the single most important factor determining how well you do at investing.

    19. Investors anchor to the idea that a fair price for a stock must be more than they paid for it. It’s one of the most common, and dangerous, biases that exists. “People do not get what they want or what they expect from the markets; they get what they deserve,” writes Bill Bonner.

    20. Investors want to believe in someone. Forecasters want to earn a nice living. One of those groups is going to get suckered. I think you know who.

    21. Companies that focus on their stock price will eventually lose their customers. Companies that focus on their customers will eventually boost their stock price. This is simple, but forgotten by countless managers.

    22. When appearing on CNBC, most money managers are introduced with a word about how much money they oversee, not how well they’ve done managing that money. There’s a reason for that. “Joe Smith helps oversee $10 billion,” sounds better than “Joe Smith has underperformed the market his entire career.”

    23. “In the financial world, good ideas become bad ideas through a competitive process of ‘can you top this?’” Jim Grant once said. A smart investment leveraged up with debt becomes a bad investment very quickly.

    24. The United States is the only major economy whose working-age population is growing at a reasonable rate. This may be the most important economic variable of the next half-century.

    25. As Erik Falkenstein says: “In expert tennis, 80% of the points are won, while in amateur tennis, 80% are lost. The same is true for wrestling, chess, and investing: Beginners should focus on avoiding mistakes, experts on making great moves.” Ditto for investors. .

    26. You can control your portfolio allocation, your own education, who you choose to listen to, what you choose to read, what evidence you choose to pay attention to, and how you respond to certain events. You cannot control what the Fed does, laws Congress sets, the next jobs report, or whether a company will beat earnings estimates. Focus on the former; try to ignore the latter.

    27. Investors suffer heavily from the “illusion of control,” or thinking that your decisions and skill led to a desired outcome, when luck was likely a big factor. If you’ve ever made money day trading and patted yourself on the back for a job well done, you’re probably a victim of the illusion of control.

    28. Every bubble starts with a rational idea that gets pushed to an irrational extreme. That’s why so many people fall for them.

    29. A little over a decade ago, Apple was a joke, GM was a powerhouse, Greece was strong, Russia was bankrupt, AOL dominated the Internet, oil cost $13 a barrel, smart economists thought the government would pay off the national debt by 2009, and Fortune named Enron one of America’s “most admired corporations.” Ten years from now we’ll be telling just as many unbelievable stories of how fast things changed.

    30. In a poll of 1,000 adults, asked, “How many millions are in a trillion?” 79% of Americans either answered wrong, or didn’t know. This should be kept in mind when debating large financial problems.

    31. Some of the world’s best investors lose money on 40% of the investments they make. It’s hard to overemphasize diversification.

    32. Wall Street consistently expects earnings to beat expectations, with no sense of irony or appreciation for the word “oxymoron.”

    33. According to Longboard Asset Management, from 1983 to 2007, 40% of stocks were unprofitable, 19% lost at least three-quarters of their value, 64% underperformed the market, and 25% were responsible for all the market’s gains. Statistically, successful stock-picking is more about avoiding awful investments than finding good ones.

    34. According to Vanguard, 72% of mutual funds benchmarked to the S&P 500 underperformed the index over a 20-year period ended 2010. The phrase “professional investor” is a loose one.

    35. You can make a lifetime of smart, savvy investment moves, but if you haven’t saved enough to begin with, you’re not going to hit your goals. As the saying goes, “Save a little bit of money each month, and at the end of the year you’ll be surprised at how little you still have.”

    36. According to Bloomberg, the 50 stocks in the S&P 500 Wall Street rated the lowest at the end of 2011 outperformed the overall index by seven percentage points over the following year.

    37. In 2008, analysts predicted the S&P 500 would earn $94 per share. In reality, it earned $15 per share. Predictions are invariably the worst when the matter the most.

    38. Warren Buffett estimates he’s owned 400 to 500 stocks during his career, and made most of his money on 10 of them

    39. Most investors have no idea how they actually perform. Markus Glaser and Martin Weber of the University of Mannheim asked investors how they thought they did in the market, and then looked at their brokerage statements. “The correlation between self ratings and actual performance is not distinguishable from zero,” they concluded.

    40. In finance textbooks, “risk” is defined as short-term volatility. In the real world, risk is earning low returns, which is often caused by investors trying to avoid short-term volatility.

    41. The S&P 500 gained 26.5% in 2009 — a phenomenal year by any measure. Yet 66% of investors thought it fell that year, according to a survey by Franklin Templeton. The gulf between perception and reality can be vast.

    42. $1 invested in a recreated version of the S&P 500 in 1900 was worth more than $1,000 in early 2013, adjusted for inflation. The same dollar would be worth $6.36 if invested in Treasuries, $1.92 if placed in gold, or $0.07 if stuffed under your mattress. Over the long run, there has been so serious competition to stocks.

    43. The S&P 500 increased more than 200-fold between 1928 and 2013, yet lost at least 20% of its value 20 times during that period. People would be less scared of volatility if they knew how common it was.

    44. Since 1871, the market has spent more than 40% of all years either rising or falling more than 20%. Roaring booms and crushing busts are perfectly normal.

    45. In 2008, Gazprom CEO predicted oil would soon hit $250 a barrel. In reality, it soon hit $33 per barrel. Within months investors were lining up to hear his next prediction.

    46. Investment bank Dresdner Kleinwort looked at analysts predictions of interest rates, and compared it with what interest rates actually did in hindsight. It found an almost perfect lag. “Analysts are terribly good at telling us what has just happened but of little use in telling us what is going to happen in the future,” the bank wrote. We often confuse the rearview mirror for the windshield.

    47. You are under no obligation to read or watch financial news. If you do, you are under no obligation to take any of it seriously.

    48. The analyst who talks about his mistakes is the guy you want to listen to. Avoid the guy who doesn’t — his are much bigger.

    49. According to ConvergEx Group, “Only 58% of us are even saving for retirement in the first place.” The remaining 42% will likely only realize how poor a decision not saving was until it’s too late.

    50. John Maynard Keynes once wrote, “It is safer to be a speculator than an investor in the sense that a speculator is one who runs risks of which he is aware and an investor is one who runs risks of which he is unaware.”

    51. How much experience a money manager has doesn’t tell you much. You can underperform the market for an entire career. And many have.

    52. Financial security requires just three steps: An above-average work ethic, a below-average propensity to consume, and a desire to invest for the long haul. That’s it.

    53. The majority of market news is not only useless, but also harmful to your financial health.

    54. A large majority of economic news we think is important becomes irrelevant against big-picture trends. Derek Thompson of The Atlantic once wrote, “I’ve written hundreds of articles about the economy in the last two years. But I think I can reduce those thousands of words to one sentence. Things got better, slowly.”

    55. Someday we will look back at financial advisors who don’t have a fiduciary duty as one of the most harmful oxymorons of all time. Always make sure you understand the incentives of the advisor sitting on the other side of the table.

    56. The market doesn’t care how much you paid for a stock. Or your house. Or what you think is a “fair” price.

    57. Trust no one who is on TV more than twice a week.

    58. There were 272 automobile companies in 1909. Through consolidation and failure, three emerged on top, two of which went bankrupt. Spotting a promising trend and a winning investment are two very different things.

    59. The more someone is on TV, the less likely his or her predictions are to come true. (U.C. Berkeley psychologist Phil Tetlock has data on this).

    60. Markets go through at least one big pullback every year, and one massive one every decade. It doesn’t mean the economy is broken or that you’ve been cheated or that we’re entering a new depression. It’s just what markets do in normal course. Get used to it.

    61. There is virtually no accountability in the financial pundit arena. People who have been wrong about everything for years still draw crowds.

    62. The odds that at least one well-known company is insolvent and hiding behind fraudulent accounting are high.

    63. The low-cost index fund is one of the most useful financial inventions in history. Boring but beautiful.

    64. The book Where Are the Customers’ Yachts? was written in 1940, and most still haven’t figured out that financial advisors don’t have their best interest at heart.

    65. Take the highest level the S&P 500 traded at in every decade going back to 1880. At some point during the subsequent 10 years, stocks fell at least 10% every single time, with an average decline of 39%. Market crashes are perfectly normal.

    66. There are tens of thousands of professional money managers. Statistically, a handful of them have been successful by pure chance. Which ones? I don’t know, but I bet a few are famous.

    67. Most people would be better off if they stopped obsessing about Congress, the Federal Reserve, and the president and focused on their own financial mismanagement.

    68. The intrinsic value of the stock market as a whole increases by about 1% every six weeks. That’s what you’ll get over the long term. Everything else is noise.

    69. Try to learn as many investing mistakes as possible vicariously through others. Other people have made every mistake in the book. You can learn more from studying the investing failures than the investing greats.

    70. Several academic studies have shown that those who trade the most earn the lowest returns. Remember Pascal’s wisdom: “All man’s miseries derive from not being able to sit in a quiet room alone.”

    71. Thirty years ago, there was one hour of market TV per day. Today there’s upwards of 18 hours. What changed isn’t the volume of news, but the volume of drivel.

    72. During recessions, elections, and Federal Reserve policy meetings, people become unshakably certain about things they know nothing about.

    73. Most of what is taught about investing in school is theoretical nonsense. There are very few rich professors.

    74. There is a strong inverse relationship between exuberance and returns. The more comfortable an investment feels, the more likely you are to be disappointed.

    75. Not a single person in the world knows what the market will do in the short run. Nothing else needs to be said on this subject.

    76. Remember what Wharton professor Jeremy Siegel says: “You have never lost money in stocks over any 20-year period, but you have wiped out half your portfolio in bonds [after inflation]. So which is the riskier asset?”

    77. Warren Buffett’s best returns were achieved when markets were much less competitive. It’s doubtful anyone will ever match his 50-year record.

    78. There will be seven to 10 recessions over the next 50 years. Don’t act surprised when they come.

    79. There are no investment points awarded for difficulty or complexity. Simple strategies can lead to outstanding returns.

    80. When someone mentions charts, moving averages, head-and-shoulders patterns, or resistance levels, walk away.

    81. I have a friend of a family friend who earned several hundred thousand dollars a year as a specialist in an advanced field. He declared bankruptcy in 2009 and will probably need to work well into his 70s. I know another who never earned more than $50,000 a year but retired comfortably on his own terms.The only substantive difference between the two is that one exploited debt to live beyond his means while the other avoided it and accepted a realistic standard of living. Income and wealth aren’t as correlated as people think.

    82. No one on the Forbes 400 list of richest Americans can be described as a “perma-bear.” A natural sense of optimism not only healthy, but vital.

    83. The decline of trading costs is one of the worst things to happen to investors, as it made frequent trading possible. High transaction costs used to cause people to think hard before they acted.

    84. The best company in the world run by the smartest management can be a terrible investment if purchased at the wrong price.

    85. People talk about market averages — average P/E ratios, average annual returns —but historically, markets rarely trade anywhere close to averages. Stocks are typically swinging between far undervalued or far overvalued, crashing or surging. The middle ground we think of as “normal” almost never happens.

    86. Most IPOs will burn you. People with more information than you have want to sell. Think about that.

    87. Economist Alfred Cowles dug through forecasts a popular analyst who “had gained a reputation for successful forecasting” made in The Wall Street Journal in the early 1900s. Among 90 predictions made over a 30-year period, exactly 45 were right and 45 were wrong. This is more common than you think.

    88. For many, a house is a large liability masquerading as a safe asset.

    89. The single best three-year period to own stocks was during the Great Depression. Not far behind was the three year period starting in 2009, when the economy struggled in utter ruin. The biggest returns begin when most people think the biggest losses are inevitable.

    90. The president has much less influence over the economy than people think.

    91. However much money you think you’ll need for retirement, double it. Now you’re closer to reality.

    92. A hedge fund once described its edge by stating, “We don’t own one Apple share. Every hedge fund owns Apple.” This type of simple, contrarian thinking is worth its weight in gold in investing.

    93. One of the worst (but most common) ways to size up an investment’s potential is by looking at past returns. You should buy stocks that:

    You understand.

    Have a competitive advantage.

    Sell for attractive valuations.

    Past performance should have nothing to do with the decision.

    94. Investor Dean Williams once noted that “Expertise is great, but it has a bad side effect: It tends to create the inability to accept new ideas.” Some of the world’s best investors have no formal backgrounds in finance — which helps them tremendously.

    95. The next recession is never like the last one.

    96. Remember what Buffett says about progress: “First come the innovators, then come the imitators, then come the idiots.”

    97. And what Mark Twain says about truth: “A lie can travel halfway around the world while truth is putting on its shoes.”

    98. And what Marty Whitman says about information: “Rarely do more than three or four variables really count. Everything else is noise.”

    99. The single most important investment question you need to ask yourself is, “How long am I investing for?” How you answer it can change your perspective on everything.

    100. The bigger a merger is, the higher the odds it will be a flop. CEOs love empire-building by overpaying for companies.

    101. Investments that offer little upside and big downside outnumber those with the opposite characteristics at least 10-to-1.

    102. The most boring companies — toothpaste, food, bolts — can make some of the best long-term investments. The most innovative, some of the worst.

    103. In a 2011 Gallup poll, 34% of Americans said gold was the best long-term investment, while 17% said stocks. Two years later, stocks had gained 38%, and gold had lost 17%.

    104. Billionaire investor Ray Dalio once said, “The more you think you know, the more closed-minded you’ll be.” Repeat this line to yourself the next time you’re “certain” of something.

    105. The perfect investment doesn’t exist. Every asset class, from stocks to gold to bonds, has caused devastation to investors at some point in history.

    106. The most dangerous words in economics are not “This time is different,” but “This study proves that …”

    107. In 2012, 22% of the profits in the S&P 500 came from 2% of the companies. There is still deep concentration among highly diverse indexes.

    108. “Do nothing” are the two most powerful — and underused — words in investing. The urge to act has transferred an inconceivable amount of wealth from investors to brokers.

    109. Apple increased more than 6,000% from 2002 to 2012, but declined on 48% of all trading days. It is never a straight path up.

    110. Harvard professor and former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers says that “virtually everything I taught” in economics was called into question by the financial crisis. This is why they call it a soft science.

    111. Asked about the economy’s performance after the financial crisis, Charlie Munger once quipped, “If you’re not confused, I don’t think you understand.” A heaping scoop of humility is vital when assessing the economy.

    112. Among Americans aged 18 to 64, the average number of doctor visits decreased from 4.8 in 2001 to 3.9 in 2010. This is partly because of the weak economy, and partly because of the growing cost of medicine, but it has an important takeaway: You can never extrapolate behavior — even for something as vital as seeing a doctor — indefinitely. Behaviors change.

    113. Starting July 2013, elderly Chinese can sue their children who don’t visit often enough, according to Bloomberg. Dealing with an aging population calls for drastic measures.

    114. There is virtually no correlation between what the economy is doing and stock market returns. According to Vanguard, rainfall is actually a better predictor of future stock returns than GDP growth. (Both explain slightly more than nothing.)

    115. In hindsight, everyone saw the financial crisis coming. In reality, it was a fringe view before mid-2007. The next crisis will be the same (they all work like that).

    116. Take two investors. One is an MIT rocket scientist who aced his SATs and can recite pi out to 50 decimal places. He uses leverage and trades several times a week, tapping his intellect in attempt to outsmart the market by jumping in and out when he’s determined it’s right. The other is a country bumpkin who didn’t attend college. He saves and invests every month in a low-cost index fund come hell or high water. He doesn’t care about beating the market. He just wants it to be his faithful companion. Who’s going to do better in the long run? I’d bet on the latter all day long. “Investing is not a game where the guy with the 160 IQ beats the guy with a 130 IQ,” Warren Buffett says. Successful investors are those who know their limitations, keep their heads cool, and act with discipline. You can’t measure that.

    117. Someone once asked Warren Buffett how to become a better investor. He pointed to a large stack of annual reports and industry trade journals he had been reading that day. “Read 500 pages like this every day,” he said. “That’s how knowledge works. It builds up, like compound interest. All of you can do it, but I guarantee not many of you will do it.”

    118. Investing isn’t easy. It can get emotional. It can make you angry, nervous, scared, excited, and confused. Most of the time you make a decision under the fog of these emotions, you’ll do something regrettable. So talk to someone before making a big money move. A friend. An advisor. A fellow investor. Just discuss what you’re doing with other people. “Everyone you meet has something to teach you,” the saying goes. At worst, they give advice you don’t agree with and can ignore. More often, they’ll provide prospective and help shape your thinking.

    119. I have a friend of a family friend who earned several hundred thousand dollars a year as a specialist in an advanced field. He declared bankruptcy in 2009 and will probably need to work well into his 70s. I know another who never earned more than $50,000 a year but retired comfortably on his own terms. The only substantive difference between the two is that one exploited debt to live beyond his means while the other avoided it and accepted a realistic standard of living. Income and wealth aren’t as correlated as people think.

    120. Gold, often touted as the bastion of stability, fell nearly 70% from the 1980s through the early 2000s. Treasury bonds lost 40% of their inflation-adjusted value from the end of World War II through the early 1980s. Stocks, nearly unquestioned as the greatest investments in 2000, fell 40% by March 2009. And real estate … well, you know. Investing is risky. Bad things happen eventually happen to all assets. Valuations get out of whack, industries change, managers screw up, politicians make terrible decisions, and things don’t always work out as expected. Diversification is key. As are patience, an open mind, and an ability to ignore crowds and hype.

    121. IBM estimates that global money managers overcharge investors by $300 billion a year for failing to deliver returns above a benchmark index. If you think the regret and shame these managers feel is stronger than the joy they get from driving their Lexus to their beachfront home, I have a bridge — and a CDO — to sell you.

    122. You only realize who the great investors are during bear markets and panics. “Only when the tide goes out do you realize who has been swimming naked,” Warren Buffett says.

    123. Two things make an economy grow: Population growth and productivity growth. Everything else — all the complex stuff we fret about — is just a function of one of those two drivers.

    124. John Reed once wrote, “When you first start to study a field, it seems like you have to memorize a zillion things. You don’t. What you need is to identify the core principles — generally three to twelve of them — that govern the field. The million things you thought you had to memorize are simply various combinations of the core principles.” Keep that in mind when getting frustrated over complicated financial formulas.

    125. Remember what Nassim Taleb says about randomness in markets. “If you roll dice, you know that the odds are one in six that the dice will come up on a particular side. So you can calculate the risk,” he says. “But, in the stock market, such computation sare bull — you don’t even know how many sides the dice have!”

    126. The S&P 500 gained 27% in 1998. But just five stocks — Dell, Lucent, Microsoft, Pfizer, and Wal-Mart — accounted for more than half the gain.

    127. Maggie Mahar once wrote that “men resist randomness, markets resist prophecy.” Those six words explain most people’s bad experiences in the stock market.

    128. It’s easy to mistake luck for success. As John D. Rockefeller once said, the key to success is: 1) get to work early, 2) stay late, 3) strike oil.

    129. Bill Bonner says there are two ways to think about what money buys. There’s the standard of living, which can be measured in dollars, and there’s the quality of your life, which can’t be measured at all.

    130. If you’re going to try to predict the future — whether it’s where the market is heading, or what the economy is going to do, or whether you’ll be promoted —think in terms of probabilities, not certainties. Death and taxes are the only exceptions, as they say.

    131. Focus on not getting beat by the market before you think for one second about trying to beat it.

    132. As Nate Silver writes, “When a possibility is unfamiliar to us, we do not even think about it.” The biggest risk is almost always something people aren’t thinking about. That’s what makes it risky.

    133. Dan Gardner writes, “No one can foresee the consequences of trivia and accident, and for that reason alone, the future will forever be filled with surprises.”

    135. I once asked Nobel Prize-winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman about a key to making better decisions. “You should talk to people who disagree with you and you should talk to people who are not in the same emotional situation you are,” he said. Try this before making your next investment decision.

    136. According to The Wall Street Journal, in 2010, “for every 1% decrease in shareholder return, the average CEO was paid 0.02% more.”

    137. A rare 1-cent coin from 1793 in 2012 sold for $1.38 million. That sounds amazing until you realize it’s an annual return of less than 9%, or about the same as stocks have produced historically.

    138. Since 1994, stock market returns are flat if the three days before the Federal Reserve announces interest-rate policy are removed, according to a study by the Federal Reserve.

    139. According to author Tim Noah, average stock options granted to CEOs between 1992 and 2000 rose from $800,000 to $7 million, and average total compensation quadrupled.

    140. In 1989, the CEOs of the seven largest U.S. banks earned an average of 100 times what a typical household made. By 2007, more than 500 times. By 2008, several of those banks no longer existed.

    Gilla

  • Clas Ohlson får väl ses som ett typfall för en bra IPO. Jag tror inte att jag hade tecknat men emissionen var välskött och de som tecknade IPO har fått se både en värdeökning och en prisökning i sina innehav.

    Nu i efterhand känns det även som att logiken i själva IPO:n också var rimlig både för ägarfamiljen och för de som tecknade emissionen. Pengarna man fick vid emissionen gick till tillväxt (öppnande av butiker) och för familjemedlemmar innebar börsnoteringen att man kunde börja likvidera sitt innehav stegvis vilket krävde en börsnotering.Till skillnad från riskkapital har man dessutom inte dumpat ut sina innehav utan olika familjemedlemmar har sålt när de så önskat vilket ger en rimlig förklaring till både det konservativa noteringspriset (inte bränna ägarna) och varför man valde att gå ut på börsen istället för att sälja till privata placerare.

    Citat från noteringsprospektet som man även levt upp till:
    ***********
    Erbjudandet från aktieägarna skall vidare ses mot bakgrund av att Clas Ohlson är ett familjebolag på väg in i fjärde generationen. En marknadsnotering ger likviditet i ägarnas aktieinnehav, vilket underlättar framtida generationsskiften.
    ***********

    Gilla

  • Intressant med prospekten! Aldrig tänkt på att de kan innehålla unik information innan! Geoff Gannons inlägg är klockrent, och det är en viktig faktor att ha i bakhuvudet. Jag köper sällan eller aldrig bolag med offensiva balansräkningar, och räknar visserligen inte heller med att något av portföljbolagen skal ”svinga pendeln” och belåna sig agressivt, men den möjligheten/risken finns ju alltid.

    Angående bra IPOer har jag en känsla av att Flügger kan ha varit en sådan, efter att ha läst om bolagets anledningar till att vara noterade. Liknande historia om ett familjebolag.

    Gilla

    • Nej det är allt lite tveksamt om man vill att ett bolag ska ”svinga pendeln”. Delvis gärna, men förmodligen inte helt. Beror väl iofs kraftigt på vad det är för typ av bolag. Ja fantastiskt inlägg, synd att han verkar ha slutat skriva för Gurufocus.

      Ingen koll på Flugger, men låter inte alls orimligt. Vet jag läste någon analys av bolaget någonstans, såg rätt intressant ut men var något som inte gjorde mig jättelockad just då, kanske priset.

      Gilla

        • Ja det var nog den analysen 🙂 Ja finns förmodligen en hel del vettiga anledningar till att ett bolag ska vara noterat. Ett exempel där jag tänkt en del kring det är Traction. Rent kapitalmässigt behöver de verkligen inte vara noterade, och man kan fråga vilken funktion det fyller eftersom free floaten är minimal. Men jag tror att i den bransch de agerar i ger det ett extra förtroende att vara noterat som är fördelaktigt i hur verksamheten drivs. Finns

          Gilla

Kommentera

Fyll i dina uppgifter nedan eller klicka på en ikon för att logga in:

WordPress.com Logo

Du kommenterar med ditt WordPress.com-konto. Logga ut / Ändra )

Twitter-bild

Du kommenterar med ditt Twitter-konto. Logga ut / Ändra )

Facebook-foto

Du kommenterar med ditt Facebook-konto. Logga ut / Ändra )

Google+ photo

Du kommenterar med ditt Google+-konto. Logga ut / Ändra )

Ansluter till %s